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With the rise of China over the recent decades, both economic and 
geopolitical, pundits have increasingly come to remind us that once upon 
a time what we now call China was the centre of its world. The implication 
invariably is that just like the historical China was once a centre of global 
gravity, its current trajectory may be expected to bring today’s China 
inexorably back into the centre of the global order from which it only briefly 
abstained itself for a few recent centuries.
When making such conjectures, we assume we safely know what China 
is and where it is. But what is this “China”, Zhongguo or Zhonghua, the 
“Middle Kingdom” or “Central Civilisation”, as it is famously called in its 
native version? It certainly has the claim to centrality in its very name. Yet 
the name was emphatically not established as a geographic or ethnic label 
for a territorial state or a nation. Rather, it represented a bold normative 
claim, a universalist assertion of value. It resembles such lofty epithets as 
“the Land of the Free”, “the new Rome”, or “Zion” in that it is above all 
an aspirational title. Historically, the gravitational pull that has constituted 
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what some have called “the Sinosphere” was due to this aspirational universal 
moral claim more than it was the result of an actual geopolitical hegemony. 
Until the twentieth century and the arrival on the stage of that brave new 
invention –the nation– neither territory nor ethnicity really defined “China”. 
A situated view from the neighbourhood may help to clarify this confusing 
situation. Well embedded in the broader Sinosphere through a complex 
history of negotiating its relations to the succession of dynastic empires on 
the mainland, the Japanese archipelago has long been the locus of discussions 
about the meaning and purpose of the Chinese claim to represent the “Middle 
Kingdom”. Indeed, in terms of statehood and asserted or wished cultural 
identity, “Japan” has defined itself for most of its history by acknowledging, 
denying, emulating or arrogating that claim to centrality. We can understand 
much about what “China” has meant by mapping Japanese aspirations to 
become China. 
Key-words: China, Japan, Sinosphere, politics, Confucianism, nationalism.
Resumen
El continuo auge económico y geopolítico de China nos recuerda que lo 
que actualmente se denomina China fue hace un tiempo el Reino del Centro, el 
centro del mundo. La implicación de esta afirmación es que al igual que la China 
histórica fue centro gravitacional global en Asia, su trayectoria actual puede 
reposicionar a China inexorablemente en el centro del orden mundial. El análisis 
histórico de Zhongguo o Zhonghua, la “Tierra del Medio” o la “Civilización 
Central”, y su postulación a convertirse en referencia moral universal, sin contar 
con la hegemonía geopolítica real sobre la región circundante, puede arrojar luz 
sobre este tema. La ambición de China se asemejaba a epítetos como “la Tierra 
de los hombres libres”, “la Nueva Roma” o “Zión”. Históricamente, la fuerza 
gravitacional que constituyó lo que algunos han denominado la sinoesfera procedía 
de esta postulación moral universal a la cual aspiraba. Dentro de la sinoesfera, en 
una compleja historia de negociación de relaciones con las sucesivas dinastías 
imperiales que gobernaban en el continente, Japón ha sido durante tiempo el 
punto focal de discusión sobre el significado y objetivo de la postulación china de 
representar el Reino del Centro. Efectivamente, a lo largo de su historia, Japón se 
ha definido a sí mismo a través del reconocimiento, la negación, la emulación o 
la demanda de esa centralidad. Quizás podamos entender mejor lo que China ha 
significado profundizando en las aspiraciones japonesas de ser China.
Palabras-clave: China, Japón, sinoesfera, política, confucianismo, 
nacionalismo.
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I. 
The sudden, supernova-like appearance of the People’s Republic of China 
near the zenith of the starry skies of our century as the second largest economy 
and a major world power makes it feel like nearly everything about it is new. 
Its economic miracle, which has happened over the last couple of decades; the 
skyscraper-filled skyline of its sprawling cities, many of which did not even 
exist twenty years ago and now house millions of new urbanites who used to be 
peasants in a backward rural countryside; its society awakening to the full rage of 
commercialised consumption; its government’s new geopolitical assertiveness, 
which affects not only the increasingly concerned close neighbours, but whole 
regions far and wide. Yet, the seeming novelty of it all may be deceptive. In 
many senses –although precisely not in the most expected sense– the current 
rise of China is better understood as the return to business as usual. 
A historian of East Asia is mostly fascinated not by how new these 
developments are, but how familiar they look from the longue durée perspective.2 
The queues of western countries’ diplomatic and business delegations lining 
up at the door to secure contracts and advantageous treatment for their 
trading interests remind us of the centuries during which one western entity 
after another joined the scramble for Chinese export goods and the privilege 
of access to the Chinese market. We tend to flag the so-called age of great 
voyages and discoveries as a hallmark of the dynamism of European history 
that set off the globalisation whose results we still live with. But the fact is 
that while the peripheral Europe had for most of its history little produce to 
offer that might attract overseas merchants, Europeans braved the dangers and 
misery of high seas primarily in order to reach the centre of economic gravity 
of the pre-modern world –China–. We all know, although we typically fail to 
appreciate the significance of the fact, that even the so-called New World was 
“discovered” as an accidental by-product of an attempt to reach the East Asian 
markets. The Europeans of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
risked their life and limb in order not to discover the world but to bring home 
the prizes that, next to spices, were the most coveted and profitable consumer 
goods: first silk, then porcelain and later tea. Each of these items followed 
the same trajectory from rare imported luxury to an indispensable article of 
the daily life of most Europeans3 in much the same way that we now live our 
2  Cf. Philip A. Kuhn, Origins of the Modern Chinese State, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2002; Alexander Woodside, Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World 
History, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
3  Cf. Timothy Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World, 
London: Profile Books, 2009; Jan de Vries, The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the 
Household Economy, 1650 to the Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Maxine 
Berg and Helen Clifford, eds., Consumers and Luxury: Consumer Culture in Europe 1650-1850, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.
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lives surrounded inescapably by objects of daily use that are nearly without an 
exception “made in China”.
By the same token, the current ambivalence with regard to the Beijing 
government sounds like an equally well-rehearsed story. It comprises a 
peculiar mixture of, on the one hand, envious awe at the sheer magnitude of its 
accomplishment in keeping a huge territory and population together in relative 
peace and order and, on the other hand, moral misgivings as to the methods by 
which such a feat is achieved. In that vein, an infamous head of an EU member 
state (the current president of the Czech Republic, Miloš Zeman), during his 
recent official visit to PRC, was reported to have declared he had come to 
China “to learn how to improve social stability”, even while his predecessor 
in the same office (the former president of the Czech Republic, the late Václav 
Havel) warned of the lack of respect for basic human and civil rights and the 
systematic persecution of dissenting opinion in the PRC4. But none of this is 
a twenty-first or even twentieth-century novelty. Ever since a steady trickle of 
reports about all aspects of China’s society and polity began to arrive in Europe 
in the seventeenth century, Chinese statecraft has been an object of intense 
interest that mixed admiration with apprehension and enthusiasm with disdain.5
Among the philosophers of the European Enlightenment, Voltaire of 
course stood out as one of the most outspoken advocates of the China ideal, as 
the translation of his short text “De la Chine” in the present issue documents. 
Based on the information that he and his contemporaries drew predominantly 
from Jesuit missionary reports6, he made China to stand for the opposite of 
almost everything that he criticised about contemporary Europe. It stood for 
reasonable natural deism as opposed to the superstition and priestcraft that 
plagued western history; it stood for tolerant enlightenment as opposed to 
bigoted zealotry; it stood for a government that, absolute in name, was in fact 
limited by laws and institutions which prevented capricious abuse of power; 
and it stood for the rule of the scholar-officials, professional administrators 
selected for their knowledge, as opposed to the rule of hereditary nobility. It 
may sound peculiar that one could be at the same time an admirer of the English 
parliamentarism and of the Qing dynasty’s imperial state, but in Voltaire’s 
case this had its logic. Both systems were presented as posing different but 
4  “Nebudu vás poučovat o lidských právech”, Lidové Noviny, October 30, 2014, http://
www.lidovky.cz/zeman-do-ciny-se-ucim-jezdit-jak-stabilizovat-spolecnost-pe5-/zpravy-domov.
aspx?c=A141030_180244_ln_domov_ele [accessed on 31 January 2016].
5  Cf. W. W. Davis, ‘‘China, the Confucian Ideal, and the European Age of Enlightenment,’’ Journal 
of the History of Ideas 44 (1983), pp. 523-48; David Martin Jones, The Image of China in Western 
Social and Political Thought, New York: Palgrave, 2001; Basil Guy, “The French Image of China 
Before and After Voltaire”, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century no. 21, Geneva: Libraire 
E. Droz, 1963. 
6  E.g., Louis Le Comte, Nouveaux memoires sur l’état présent de la Chine, Paris, 1696; Jean 
Baptiste Du Halde, Description de l’Empire de la Chine, Paris, 1735.
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comparably effective institutional curbs on the arbitrary use of power and 
both seemed conducive to the rise of civilisation in producing peoples free of 
supersition.
However, both the past and the present understanding of the place and 
trajectory of China in the world have been based on an assumption that is at least 
problematic. The assumption is that underneath the mutable face of the numerous 
and very different polities that have historically occurred on its territory, there is an 
unchangeable essence of “China”-hood. In his own fashion, Voltaire immortalised 
this understanding in his play L’Orphelin de la Chine, where a new foreign conqueror 
of the Middle Kingdom is so awed and humbled by the singular moral uprightness 
of his conquered Chinese subject that he fully embraces the ways of the former 
indigenous Chinese rulers, effectively surrendering his foreign identity to become 
“Chinese”7. Far from a fanciful fairy-tale, this type of narrative continues alive as 
an actual historiographical trope where the Mongol or Manchu conqueror dynasties 
in China are claimed to have fully assimilated and “Sinicised”, which wards off 
any threat of a rupture to the continuity of the “five thousand years of Chinese 
history”. The key difference is between Voltaire’s understanding of the essence 
behind this historical continuity and the understanding proposed by mainstream 
twentieth century national historiography. To the former, this underlying essence 
was a system of mœurs, manners, practical morals embodied in the collective life of 
a society8. To the latter, it is a vaguely ethnically and culturally defined nationhood. 
It is a telling difference that provides us with an important trace to follow over the 
subsequent pages.
II.
The rise of the People’s Republic of China to the status of the world’s 
second biggest economy and to growing geopolitical prominence has attracted 
enormous attention and generated much discussion worldwide. Yet this 
economic and geopolitical success has completely overshadowed the magnitude 
of a completely different but equally astounding achievement of a succession 
of governments in Beijing. This achievement consists in successfully selling 
China, or Zhongguo in its native version, both domestically and internationally 
as a nation and a nation’s state, even while both the shape of its current territory 
and its composition reflect the empire and its expansive colonial conquest that 
preceded the People’s Republic and its allegedly national statehood.
7  Voltaire, “L’Orphelin de la Chine”, critical edition by Basil Guy, in Haydn Mason, ed., Les 
œuvres complètes de Voltaire, Vol. 45A, Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2009.
8  Cf. Voltaire, “Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations”, critical edition by Bruno Bernard et al., 
in Haydn Mason, ed., Les œuvres complètes de Voltaire, Vol. 22, Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2010.
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This sets today’s Chinese state apart from, say, the Habsburg empire, the 
Ottoman empire, the British empire, or the Romanov empire and its successor 
the Soviet Union. Albeit all very different from one another and faced with 
different challenges and crises, all of them decomposed along the vectors of 
centrifugal forces of mounting calls for national statehood, ethnic, political 
and religious self-determination, and regional fragmentation. Yet unlike any 
of them, the empire overseen from Beijing by the Manchu emperor Qianlong 
at the end of the eighteenth century, at the historical height of its territorial 
expansion, was nearly the same as the one overseen from Beijing by the cadres 
of the Chinese Communist Party today. And despite the narrative of officially 
recognised minorities represented in an ethnically composite Chinese state, 
the key ideological narrative employed by the current Beijing leadership to 
legitimate its rule is a straightforward case of good old-fashioned nationalism 
of the same sort that had once led various German or Slavic peoples to assert 
their national statehood and independence from the institutional framework of 
the Habsburg empire. In the eyes of many authors, the People’s Republic of 
China apparently achieved what Benedict Anderson expressed in a memorable 
metaphor, “stretching the short, tight, skin of a nation over the oversized body 
of an empire”9.
This ideological brinkmanship can only work as long as one key assumption 
is in place, namely, that beneath the superficial plurality of dynastic states and 
political entities that historically coincided, succeeded or replaced one another 
on the territory of the contemporary Chinese state, there underlies a deeper 
unity of a single national past, five thousand years of continuum of Chineseness, 
Zhongguo-ness, a cultural, ethnic, territorial or some other vaguely undefined 
identity. This is of course not a peculiarity of the contemporary Chinese state. 
It is rather, again, a standard tool in the toolbox of all modern nationalisms, 
shared and mimicked worldwide in a hundred local variations on the same 
basic theme10.
But has this not always been the case? Has not “China” like every other 
human community always claimed an exclusive distinctive essence and unity 
that posits a radical difference between “us” on the inside and “them” on the 
outside, whatever the language in which such a distinction is articulated? The 
most intriguing lesson from history is precisely that the answer is no, it has not 
always been the case. For throughout most of its history, “China”, at least in its 
native version of Zhongguo, the “Land of the Middle” or “Middle Kingdom”, 
and Zhonghua, the “Central Flourishing” or “Central Civilisation”, was in fact 
not the name of a territory or a state, still less that of a nation or any such 
9  Benedict Anderson, The Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983, p. 86.
10  Duara, Prasenjit, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.
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purportedly timeless essence. Instead, we could call it an aspirational name. An 
ambitious symbolic epithet that is not a name tag for a thing or a place, but a 
claim to embody a normative ideal.
III.
This requires some clarification of the historical background. The terms 
Zhongguo and Zhonghua emerged early in history and were almost certainly 
first used to refer to the situation during the first millennium BCE when a 
plurality of smaller kingdoms scattered over the territory either still deferred 
to a lose sovereignty of the last of the classical dynasties (the Zhou) or had 
already launched an open bid to appropriate the sovereignty to themselves. 
These were the “central states” (for Zhongguo can function as both the singular 
and the plural) that counted in the geopolitical game for hegemony in the core 
geographic area that still falls under the territory of the People’s Republic of 
China today. The lands outside of this core, and the peoples that did not enter 
the game or were regarded as a nuisance, threat, or object of conquest, were 
designated as barbarian in a practice familiar from other histories11.
Out of those centuries of competition, something like a unified imperial 
state emerged when the Qin state’s ruler eliminated the competitors and 
became the sole sovereign “beneath the heaven” at the end of the third century 
BCE. But before that happened, in the intense debates that sought to address 
the geopolitical instability and moral dilemmas that the situation entailed, 
there emerged a range of formulations of a moral philosophy of statecraft 
and applied historiography that was offered by itinerant teachers, intellectuals 
and politico-economic consultants to the rulers and ministers of the many 
statelets as a guide through the difficult times. In the western parlance, the 
most influential and durable among these strains of thought came to be known 
as “Confucianism”. But around East Asia, although Master Kong, transcribed 
by the Jesuit missionaries as Confucius, was always undoubtedly regarded as 
a central figure in all this, this was never understood as a doctrine promulgated 
by a single prophet from whom it would take its exclusive name. This was 
simply “learning”. Just like we do not speak primarily of “Platonism” or 
“Aristotelianism”, but rather simply of “philosophy”.
11  Cf. Fairbank, John K., ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968; Fang Weigui, “Yi, Yang, Xi, Wai and Other Terms: 
The Transition from ‘Barbarian’ to ‘Foreigner’ in Late Imperial China”, in Michael Lackner et al., 
eds., New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China, 
Leiden: Brill, 2001.
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Although it had not gone unchallenged, it was in terms of this (“Confucian”) 
moral philosophy and cosmology that the categories of rulership, legitimate 
sovereignty and desirable shape of the polity came to receive their default 
definitions. And it was in terms of the same moral philosophy and cosmology 
that the notion of “China”, i.e., Zhongguo or Zhonghua became a universalist 
statement of principle and a destination to be aspired to, rather than a simple 
descriptive label for a place or a people.
IV.
To sketch it in grossly simplified terms that gloss over countless 
disagreements and centuries of heated and divergent discussions and 
institutional experiments, the normative ideal that “China” as Zhongguo 
came to stand for could be described as follows12. “China” is opposed to the 
barbarian “others” not because of its national greatness or because of any 
inherently unique qualities of the land and the people. “China”, Zhonghua, is 
the Central Civilisation because it embodies virtues that are universal in that 
they correspond to the “Way All Things Need to Be” by their own innermost 
inclination. These virtues are universal, not culturally specific to a particular 
people or location, because they define the order of the human world that is an 
extension or reflection of the natural order of the universe. It is the universal 
Way for all human relations to be, according to the same inescapable and at the 
same time benevolent necessity that makes the day break after the night and 
the four seasons follow one after the other. In the best possible scenario, the 
sovereign ruler who guards the polity is the ultimate guarantor of this universal 
order of all human relations. He represents the linchpin between the cosmic 
order of the universe and the moral order of the human world. Turning north, 
he faces the heaven and receives the mandate to govern in the name of the 
same Way following which the stars stick to their fixed trajectories, spring 
succeeds the winter, parents love their children and sons revere their parents. 
Because of this pivotal role, the ruler is styled the “Son of Heaven”. And the 
hierarchical order of the human world, with the sovereign ruler at the top, is 
justified and legitimated by the fact that it embodies these fundamental virtues 
of benevolence, humaneness, charity, love, care and trust between parents 
and children, rulers and subjects, kings and ministers. It is of course perfectly 
possible to transgress against such a basic order of human things, to disregard 
all these fundamental virtues and behave like a predatory beast, but such a 
12  Cf. Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1985; Anne Cheng, Histoire de la pensée chinoise, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997.
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conduct is ultimately self-destructive, because it undermines the very structures 
of human sociability, the very possibility of living together like humans and not 
like animals.
Now, in the harsh empirical reality of the usual business of keeping the 
human world politically together, tax revenues coming in and the structures of 
power and privilege in place, such an idealistic formulation of the underlying 
principles of legitimacy may sound like an ideological whitewash and no doubt 
it has been used like that more than once in the course of history. But powerful 
normative ideas are double-edged weapons and can always turn against those 
who wield them. To legitimate the supreme sovereign’s rule in the name of the 
virtues he is supposed to embody may sound like a cheap way to hold on to 
the throne. But if fully embraced, this notion at the same time detracts from 
the untouchable supremacy of the sovereign. After all, the sovereign is only 
a sovereign for as long as his government upholds and exemplifies the virtues 
that define the Way things necessarily are. A king or a dynasty may forfeit the 
mandate to govern, if they are seen to blatantly fail in this basic duty. And 
having forfeited that mandate, they are no better than armed robbers holding 
their subjects at the tip of a sword. Such villains receive no protection from 
the notions of loyalty and reverence due to true kings and justly deserve to be 
chased away or killed off. This opens door to a justification of a revolution, 
a removal of the ruler who lost the moral right to rule because he and his 
ministers failed to uphold the normative virtues of the Way things inevitably 
are and behaved, or allowed others to behave, like wild predatory beasts. 
The number of emperors who suffered violent deaths at the hands of their 
ministers and subjects throughout Chinese history is in fact considerably high. 
The contemporary Chinese and Japanese term for “revolution”, geming (J: 
kakumei), is lifted straight from the ancient (“Confucian”) classic of Mencius, 
which justifies the overthrow of corrupt rulers in the name of the “shift of the 
[heavenly] mandate”, geming. And the translation for “republic”, gonghe-guo 
(J: kyōwakoku), comes straight from one of the earliest comprehensive histories, 
Sima Qian’s famous Records of the Grand Scribe, which recorded an episode of 
the ousting of the oppressive king Li of the Western Zhou (ninth century BCE) 
and the subsequent period of benevolent kingless rule by virtuous ministers 
“in unison and harmony”, gonghe (J: kyōwa)13. It means that if you wanted 
to call for the revolution and the establishment of republics in the twentieth 
century East Asia, you would be doing so in fact in the language of the moral 
universalism established by the so-called “Confucian” classical learning.
13 Saitō Kowashi, Meiji no kotoba—Bunmei kaika to Nihongo [Meiji words: Progress of civilisation 
and Japanese language], Tokyo: Kōdansha, (1977) 2005.
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IV.
However, if a dynasty may forfeit its mandate, might not even “China”, as 
Zhongguo, lose its “China”-hood? If Zhongguo has been defined as a structure 
of virtue and humaneness, a civilisational ideal that emanates transformative 
moral radiation far and wide, what happens if it ceases to be the radiant centre 
of civilising virtue? Or what happens if another society and polity becomes a 
more convincing embodiment of such a centre? Does not China, as an empirical 
historical state and people, in such a case cease to be “China”, Zhongguo, the 
normative ideal of the “Central Civilisation”?
Part of the modern misunderstanding regarding the very concept of 
“centrality” of the “Central Civilisation” revolves around the criteria of what 
counts as the centre. As the geopolitical and economic clout of mainland China 
has continued to grow over the recent decades, pundits have increasingly come 
to remind us that once upon a time China was the centre of the world, exactly 
as the native version of its name indicates. The message behind such a reminder 
is that just as it was once a centre of global gravity, China’s current trajectory 
should be expected to bring it inexorably back centre stage of the global order 
from which it only briefly abstained itself for a few recent centuries. 
When making such conjectures, we assume we safely know what this 
“China” is and where it can be found. But that may be a problematic assumption. 
There is no doubt that the strong gravitational pull over close and more distant 
neigbourhood, a pull that some have come to call the “Sinosphere”, was to 
an extent the function of the sheer size of the empires like those of the Han, 
Sui or Tang dynasties, their military might, diplomatic weight, and economic 
strength. But to stand for the “Land of the Middle”, Zhongguo, or the “Central 
Civilisation”, Zhonghua, has meant very different things at different points 
in history and our default criteria of what counts as “the centre” –let us say, 
a military and economic superpower capable of projecting its influence and 
protecting its interests worldwide– reflect a very different understanding 
pertaining to a different era. It is not always easy to conceive what that claim to 
centrality has historically meant and how it was acknowledged and negotiated 
by the many bystanders.
During some of the past centuries and millennia, dynastic empires like 
that of the Han, the Tang or the Qing –the various putative predecessors of 
the present state that the CPC runs from Beijing– did indeed represent centres 
of geopolitical and economic power without any serious regional or even 
global rival. But even during the many centuries when that was not the case, 
“China”, Zhongguo or “Middle Kingdom”, did not necessarily lose its central 
status. That was case, for instance, of the Song dynasty, probably the most 
geopolitically embattled of the great imperial states of Chinese history. In the 
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twelfth century, the Song lost to the northern Jurchen invaders a full half of the 
former territories north of the Yangzi river, including the capital city Kaifeng 
and the historical heartland of the Yellow River valley. It continued to hang 
precariously on to survival in the relatively peripheral south paying a tribute as 
ransom to the Jurchen Jin dynastic state in the north, until both were overrun 
by the Mongols14. And yet, despite its lackluster geopolitical performance, it 
continued to represent a key point of cultural reference, a centre of sorts that 
broadcast some powerful messages into the world around. 
It was the squeezed and besieged environment of the southern Song polity 
that in fact consolidated many of the elements that to the neighbouring region 
came to stand for the most appreciated Chinese export. This was above all the 
new systematisation of the so-called “neo-Confucianism” as a comprehensive 
universal moral, political, and cosmological philosophy and the concomitant 
practice of a centrally organised state administered by the professional civil 
service recruited through highly competitive state examinations. Both of these 
went on to become the staple components of a universally applicable “China”-
hood. The scholar Zhu Xi, who was active during this time, was what Ibn Rushd, 
or Averroes, had been to Aristotle. If Confucius was the Philosopher, Zhu Xi 
became the Commentator. And the grand synthesis of cosmological, moral, 
and political theory based on ancient classical texts and histories, of which he 
was the principal author and which reached Korea and Japan, continued to be 
referred to as “Song learning” (J: Sōgaku), although the dynastic state itself had 
long disappeared.
Being an economic and military powerhouse was neither the necessary nor 
the sufficient criterion to qualify as the “Middle Kingdom”, Zhongguo, or the 
“Central Civilisation”, Zhonghua. And neither the territory, nor any particular 
ethnic composition of the population, apparently, would of themselves make 
one into “China”. What did make you into “China”, then? When the northern 
invaders, like the Jurchens, Mongols or the Manchus (all historically called 
“Tatars” in Europe and “Northern barbarians” in China proper), had completely 
brought down the existing empires (as happened to the Song or the Ming), 
overrun the whole of their former territories and established their own dynastic 
states on the ruins, did that place still continue to be “China”, Zhongguo? Or 
had it become “Barbary” instead? If a conquering tribe fully embraced the 
universalist premises of “the Middle Kingdom” principle and the new rulers 
donned the mantle of the virtuous benevolent sage rulers, the way the Manchu 
emperors did in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had they become as 
“Chinese” as any of the home-grown dynasties? And if neither the territory nor 
14  Barfield, Thomas J. The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1989; Dabringhaus, Sabine, and Roderich Ptak, eds., China and Her Neighbours: Borders, 
Visions of the Other, Foreign Policy, 10th to 19th Century, Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1997.
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the ethnicity were its ultimate locus and anchor, was “China” capable of shifting 
somewhere else altogether? The default ethnic and territorial perspective from 
which we instinctively organise our world into distinctive continuities and 
divisions today, the patches of the same colour on the Mercatorian projection 
of the Earth’s surface, is utterly unsuited for understanding what range of 
meanings “China” as Zhongguo carried.
V.
The question of where “China” is may of course only ever arise when there 
is a compelling outside point of reference. But the first time it was actually 
raised was most probably by people whom we would commonsensically 
designate as “Chinese” inside the territory that we would designate as China. 
In the fragmented and volatile period of the so-called Six Dynasties after the 
fall of the Han empire in the third century CE, a thrilling new religion arrived 
from the south-west. For the early Chinese-speaking adepts of Buddhism 
the appellation “China”, Zhongguo, or the Land of the Middle, was entirely 
reserved for the centre of the world as they saw it: India, the source of the 
transformative radiation that brought to them the message that changed their 
understanding of the human world and of the virtues that supported it.15 As the 
new religion made its successful missionary journey into the heart of the Sui 
and Tang empires, to the Korean peninsula and on to the Japanese archipelago, 
its progress was accompanied by the spread of maps of the world that indeed 
placed the Indian subcontinent squarely in the middle of the known earth16. At 
some point, to some at least, India could have been the true “China”. But this 
was in the very logic of the aspirational nature of the Zhongguo epithet.
It was however the people and polities outside of the boundaries of the 
actual Chinese empires proper who faced the greatest conceptual difficulty 
with the normative Zhongguo “China”-hood. Adopting the Chinese script, 
culture, technology and institutions, the parts of the world that correspond to 
contemporary Korea, Japan, or Vietnam became integral parts of the extended 
Sinosphere17. That means that they also became party to the debates about 
15  Joshua Fogel, “New Thoughts on an Old Controversy: Shina as a Toponym for China”, Sino-
Platonic Papers 229, 2012, p. 13. Cf. Tian Xiaofei, Visionary Journeys: Travel Writings from Early 
Medieval and Nineteenth-Century China, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011, p. 97. 
16  Yee, Cordell D. K., “Cartography in China”, in John B. Harley and David Woodward, eds., 
Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies (The History of Cartography, Vol. 
II.2), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994. Cf. Muroga Nobuo and Unno Kazutaka. “The 
Buddhist World Map in Japan and Its Contact with European Maps”, Imago Mundi 16 (1962), pp. 49-69.
17  Joshua Fogel, Articulating the Sinosphere: Sino-Japanese Relations in Space and Time, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.
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the normative status of the virtues defining “civilisation” and its opposites. 
Yet however diligently the Korean, Ryūkyūan or Japanese courts replicated 
the rituals and institutional structures of the mainland Tang or Song models, 
however much the learned Koreans, Ryūkyūans or Japanese considered 
themselves full participants in the investigation and practice of the Way things 
naturally are, the established civilisational geography relegated their polities 
and their countries of birth and residence to the barbarian fringes of the Chinese 
empires that continued to describe themselves as the sole “Middle kingdom”. 
The Japanese case is particularly instructive. Therefore, let us dwell on it for 
a while.
VI.
One solution for coping with the “Central Civilisation” centripetal pull 
was to establish a genealogical link to it. If the world consisted of a civilised 
core surrounded on all sides by increasingly barbaric peripheries, then one 
could try and salvage one’s position on the cultural and geographic periphery 
by claiming that one’s own culture was immediately descended from the same 
sources of that core Central Civilisation. The ancient histories, for example, 
featured the mythical figure of Taibo (J: Taihaku), the uncle of king Wen from 
the times of the foundation of the Zhou dynasty, the last pinnacle of the golden 
classical age, in the eleventh century BCE. Taibo, who was later praised by 
Master Kong, Confucius himself, as a true sage and a man of “consummate 
virtue”, chose not to press his own legitimate succession claim and rather make 
room for the smooth transition of rule to his nephew to secure the peaceful and 
benevolent government for the sake of the whole realm beneath the heaven. 
He left Zhou, the chronicles claimed, travelled east and went on the sea. This 
throwaway reference was eagerly seized on in Japan in the later ages. Since 
such a selfless sage cannot simply disappear from history, was it not perfectly 
plausible and logical to assume that it was Taihaku (Taibo) himself who founded 
the dynasty of Yamato rulers of Japan at the dawn of historical time? By the 
late seventeenth century, many leading intellectuals in Japan (Hayashi Razan, 
Kumazawa Banzan, Nakae Tōju, or Kinoshita Jun’an) fully subscribed to this 
idea18. Again, this was emphatically not an ethnic or racial claim. The point was 
not that the Japanese polity was descended from a founding father who was 
actually “Chinese”, but rather that it was descended from one of the ancient 
(universal, not Chinese) sages and founders of the (universal, not Chinese) 
18  Watanabe Hiroshi, A History of Japanese Political Thought, 1600-1901, transl. D. Noble, Tokyo: 
International House of Japan, 2012, p. 275; and idem, Kinsei Nihon shakai to Sōgaku [Early Modern 
Japanese Society and Song Confucianism], Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1985, p. 50.
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civilisation. It provided a vital link that sustained the authoritative position of 
the teaching of the universal Way in a land that would otherwise be left out of 
the ken of cultured humanity and relegated to the barbarian fringe.
Any contemporary nationalist’s instinctive reaction would probably be 
different. It would be to laugh off the whole idea of “China”, Zhongguo or 
“Middle Kingdom”, as self-aggrandising posturing of a neighbouring nation. 
Even historically, there were some who found the claim to a universal “centrality” 
of China’s “civilisation” a transparent self-serving ploy. Asami Keisai, active 
at the turn of the eighteenth century, declared that everyone everywhere tended 
to think of their own country as the middle of the world. The sages of Chinese 
antiquity and their later followers were no exception. They sought to talk up 
their own land to make it appear exceptional and unique, like everybody would. 
But when driven by this local vanity they designated our own land of Japan as 
eastern Barbary, Keisai claimed, it was a spit in our face that we are not obliged 
to suffer. For us in Japan, this is our “China”, Zhongguo, our “Land of the 
Middle”19. Despite such assertions, Asami Keisai himself continued to operate 
very much within the language of the classical “Confucian” learning. But this 
radical relativism bordered on cynicism regarding any claim to the universal 
value of virtue. It was hard to reconcile with a continued commitment to the 
practice of the Way as the pursuit of what was genuinely true and right, not only 
true and right to us. If anybody was their own “China”, Zhongguo, their own 
“Central Civilisation”, by their standards and their own standards alone, did 
that not undermine the very possibility of any real shared value of humanity? 
Was anything true and right only to a particular people in their particular time 
and place?
VII.
These were hard questions to face and most chose not to go down the 
path towards which Asami Keisai gestured. Rather, studying “Chinese” classics 
Mencius or Zhu Xi in Seoul or Edo was not unlike reading Aristotle in Cordoba, 
Salamanca, Firenze or Prague. In other words, it meant debating universal truths, 
not engaging with a “Chinese” or “Greek” philosophy, culturally peculiar to 
ethnic and geographic circumstances of places called Greece and China.
We cannot overemphasise this distinction. Even in Europe, until the 
onslaught of Romanticism and various national myth-building, none of 
19  Asami Keisai, “Chūgoku-ben” [Distinguishing China], In Nishi Junzō, ed., Nihon shisō taikei 
31: Yamazaki Ansai gakuha, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1980, pp. 416-19. Cf. Watanabe Hiroshi, Kinsei 
Nihon shakai to Sōgaku.
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the many generations of the readers of Plato and Aristotle were particularly 
concerned about what was happening in Athens during their own lifetimes. 
Reading Aristotle for normative truths did not entail having some sentimental 
predilection for “Greece”, or the various Venetian or Ottoman provinces that 
“Greece” had become in its history. In the same way, reading Mencius and Zhu 
Xi for the normative truths in Japan or Korea did not necessarily entail being 
a Sinophile, in the sense of being a friend of the Han people or of whatever 
dynastic state currently existed on the East Asian mainland. The normative 
Chūgoku and the empirical China were capable of being kept almost entirely 
separate. It is only the sort of essentialism that sees culture as a genetic property 
of an ethnically defined national community that cannot conceive of such a 
separation.
To a pre-modern observer –unaffected by the default optics of nation 
states laying their claim on the entire past of their territories– the sequence 
of the dynastic states did not necessarily compose a continuous history of a 
single unit called China with its “Chinese” (i.e., “Confucian”) culture. These 
states were different polities, different moral and political formations, long 
way removed from the classic and post-classic articulations of the normative 
ideals. And that meant that one could harbour entirely indifferent or outright 
hostile attitude to any or all of these states and yet be an ardent advocate of the 
universal normative message that was represented by the shorthand Chūgoku 
(Zhongguo), or Chūka (Zhonghua). For China was not any particular state, let 
alone an ethnic community with its peculiar (Chinese) culture, or any such other 
later invention that can stand for a stable essence underneath a flux of transient 
political formations. As Chūgoku or Chūka, “China” was an aspirational name, 
a normative claim. Just like, say, “Zion” or “Land of the Free”, it was not a 
geographic or ethnic label.
In 1826, Futagawa Sukechika, a Kyūshū-based scholar, was approached by 
a friend to write a preface for a Japanese re-translation of a Dutch re-translation 
of an English translation of a French text by a China-based Jesuit (this was 
by no means an unusual sort of Chinese whispers going on about pre-modern 
Eurasia). He agreed and in the preface written in kanbun or classical Chinese 
as was common for the genre, he exclaimed: “…Why, is this Imperial Land of 
ours not the real ‘China’ [Zhongguo, J: Chūgoku]?”20.
This was not an accidental use of the term. A good Confucian scholar, 
Futagawa spoke of China (Zhongguo; Chūgoku) of the mythical sage emperors 
Yao and Shun and the classical Three Dynasties as the undoubted source of 
the true ritual propriety and the decentralised system of enfeoffed government. 
He spoke of the decline of this classical Way in China proper as a result of the 
20  Abe Ryūhei, Nikoku kaimeiroku [Record of the Conference between the Two States], Manuscript 
copy from Kyoto University Library (preface dated 1826).
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centralising policies of the Qin prince-unifier and the Han dynastic rulers who 
followed him in fact, while rejecting him in words. He said that it was since 
this Way was lost and decline set in that China tended to suffer occupation 
by barbarians (like the Jurchen Jin, Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing states). 
Thereupon he listed the contrasting list of virtues that characterised “This 
Dynasty” (honchō) and “our Imperial Land” (kōkoku): the safety spreading 
into the fours seas and four corners of the world, the capacity to preserve 
unadulterated the ancient teachings, complete with the proper rituals and 
ceremonies; the same decentralised enfeoffed government that had once 
characterised the pre-Han China of the classical times of Confucius. It was as a 
result of this contrastive comparison that he went on to declare: Is it not really 
Japan where “China” resides now?21.
Futagawa was definitely not alone or eccentric in arguing this way. Just a 
year earlier, in 1825, Aizawa Seishisai, a retainer of the Tokugawa domain of 
Mito, wrote a treatise called Shinron or “New Theses”. He wrote it in kanbun 
or classical Chinese, the common register for educated high-status prose. This 
treatise went on to become effectively the bible to the subsequent generation 
of enthusiastic young men with a sense of mission. Amid the twin internal and 
external crises of the 1850s, these young men found in the (Chinese) text of 
Aizawa Seishisai’s New Theses a powerful articulation of what they saw as their 
sacred duty to uphold the loyalty to an image of a unified Japan and its mythical 
imperial dynasty descended in an unbroken lineage from a deity at the beginning 
of time. Seeing something as one’s sacred duty is usually not conducive to a 
pragmatic readiness to reach political compromise. Many of the enthusiastic 
young readers of the New Theses turned into extremists and assassins targeting 
both the western foreigners, whom they regarded as sneaky barbarians, and 
members of the domestic establishment, whom they regarded as traitors and 
collaborators. Daring terrorist attacks and suicidal assassination attempts were 
their favourite strategy. This made many parts of Japan of the 1850s and 1860s 
into a very volatile and dangerous place, something along the lines of Afghanistan 
in our days. And yet it was from the ranks of these young extremist readers of 
the New Theses that the future leaders of the Meiji Japan were recruited. They 
went on to become government ministers and foremost dignitaries of a restored 
imperial state and embarked on the project of constructing a nation with a mystic 
divine aura attached to it, a strategy they saw as the best blueprint for survival in 
the rough new world of inter-state competition. Aizawa Seishisai’s New Theses 
were effectively a proto-nationalist manifesto that provided the ideological 
springboard for many of these developments22.
21  Ibid.
22  Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning: Aizawa Seishisai’s New 
Theses, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1986.
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It may therefore come as a surprise to discover that whenever Aizawa 
Seishisai writes “China”, Chūgoku, Zhongguo, what he mean is in fact Japan. 
Or rather, he means the ideal unified imperial Japan towards which he evokes 
the sacred duty of uncompromising and unconditional loyalty. When he needs 
to refer to the big state across the sea on the mainland, he calls it as it mostly 
called itself, by its dynastic name, i.e., the Ming or the Qing. And when he does 
need a generic toponym beyond the particular polities on the mainland, he very 
intentionally resorts to one of the much less lofty designations that were in 
currency at the time: Seido (Western land), Tōdo or Tōzan (Tang-land or Tang-
mountains, where the name of the Tang dynasty had become a synecdoche 
for China as a whole), Kara or Morokoshi (Japanese readings of the Chinese 
character Tang), or from a different direction, Shina, to echo the European 
toponym China that we still use and that is derived from Sanskrit23.
It may strike us as puzzling and counterintuitive that the founders of 
Japanese nationalism should formulate their ideology in classical Chinese and 
that by way of doing so they should insist on calling their own land “China”. 
But exactly that was the case. Yet again, there should be nothing puzzling about 
the fact that an early nineteenth-century Japanese proto-nationalist and loyalist 
extremist could call Japan Chūgoku, “China”. It only appears puzzling if we 
allow the modern mind’s inertia to essentialise “China” into an ethno-cultural 
unit that provides a natural continuity underlying a plurality of dynastic states, 
the “five thousand years of Chinese history”. 
If only “China”, Zhongguo, is understood for what it was commonly 
understood to be, that is, neither a territory nor a nation, but a universal 
normative aspiration –really more akin to such later concepts as “civilisation” 
and “modernity”– then this rhetorical move makes perfect sense. The 
movement that culminated in the installing of a new centralised state in Japan 
in the name of a reinvented loyalism to a resurrected eternal imperial dynasty 
was a movement that took its cue from authors who insisted on Japan being 
“China”. True, a backlash against the foreign “Chinese intellectualism” in 
the name of pure and uncorrupted indigenous Japanese essence had just been 
launched by the so-called “nativist studies” of the likes of Motoori Norinaga 
(1730-1801)24, but it was the very novelty of this attack that confirmed the 
universalist understanding of classical China as the default position.
In the end, the politically active proto-nationalism took probably less from 
the sentimental cultural essentialism of a Motoori Norinaga –who was prone to 
blame all the evils of his world on the “Chinese” calculating mindset imported 
23  Joshua Fogel, “New Thoughts on an Old Controversy: Shina as a Toponym for China”, Sino-
Platonic Papers 229, August 2012.
24  Watanabe Hiroshi, “A Peculiarly ‘Pure Heart’: The Thought of Motoori Norinaga”, A History 
of Japanese Political Thought, 1600-1901, trans. David Noble, Tokyo: International House of Japan, 
2012, pp. 238-252.
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from the mainland– than from theorists like Aizawa Seishisai, whose claim 
for Japan’s exceptionality was that it was better at being China than any of 
the latter-day false pretenders to “China”-hood on the mainland. This meant, 
among other things, that Confucius, Mencius, or Zhu Xi belonged more to 
Japan’s own lineage than to any of the dynastic empires on the continent that 
we are accustomed to calling “Chinese”. Had things stayed that way, Confucius 
Institute could have been the name for Japanese state’s own soft power cultural 
centre today.
VIII.
The story, however, does not end there. The modern Japanese state, 
which resulted from the 1868 loyalist Meiji revolution that took its cue from 
the exhortations of Aizawa Seishisai, in the event did not insist on calling 
itself “China”. The new state plunged straight into a global world of high 
imperialism and the concomitant scramble for overseas colonial territories and 
markets, a world that had no plausible moral center point and the aspiration to 
create and sustain one seemed a stretch, at least for the time being. The post-
revolutionary Meiji Japan in the latter half of the nineteenth century embarked 
with great urgency on the twin project of building a strong, centralised state that 
could withstand the economic and military competition on the international 
stage, and manufacturing a unified nation, a people joined by the sense of 
common purpose and spontaneous, emotive belonging together from the past 
immemorial25. Aizawa Seishisai and his followers had seen both of these 
projects as indispensable for the creation and sustaining of a national polity of 
the kind they called for. But it was the latter of them, the creation of a nation, 
the “unity of hearts and minds of the thousands and millions”, that they saw as 
a precondition for the former, the construction of a strong state. In 1825, when 
Aizawa Seishisai penned his manifesto, there existed no nation in the Japan 
of the Tokugawa shoguns, nor in the China under the Manchu Qing dynasty26.
He was convinced that it was the unity of hearts and minds, the magnificent 
mobilising power of the national ideology, rather than any technological 
supremacy, what gave the western powers their remarkable advantage in 
conquering the globe and dictating their conditions27.
25 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985.
26 Joshua Fogel, ed., Teleology of the Modern Nation State: China and Japan, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
27 Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early Modern Japan: 
Aizawa Seishisai’s New Theses, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1986.
145The Point of the Centre: Present and Past Discourses of “China”-hood
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 18, nº 35. Primer semestre de 2016. 
Pp. 127-150.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2016.i35.07
It was invariably through Japan that the ideas of nation or race, as well 
as constitutionalism, civil rights or parliamentary government, anarchism or 
communism, reached Chinese audiences28. And it was through neologisms 
coined in Japanese translations that the conceptual vocabulary pertaining to all 
these novelties entered modern Chinese29. Nationalism was part of the toolbox 
of a global modernity that spread around in the nineteenth century by means 
of texts, translations, personal reports and hearsay, via a network of readers, 
travellers, migrants, political refugees and other brokers moving among cities 
on the crossroads of worldwide traffic in goods, people and ideas. In the years 
around the turn of the twentieth century, a flood of Chinese visitors, students, 
government officials and exiled activists arrived at Japanese shores seeking a 
recipe for fixing the broken Qing polity. Among them were some of the most 
influential voices of the country rapidly transforming from a failed empire into 
a new type of state based on freeing the “Chinese nation” from the “foreign” 
Manchu conquest. The foremost reformists Kang Youwei or Liang Qichao, as 
well as the father founder and future first president of the new Republic of 
China, Sun Yat-sen, all spent time in exile in Yokohama and Tokyo and had 
close and formative ties to the Japanese intellectual and political circles30.
The vertiginous circuit thus slowly closed at last. The universalist ideas 
of the so-called Confucian statecraft, which had long served as the discursive 
base and default legitimation to a succession of empires on the Asian mainland, 
and which posited a center of moral gravity and transformative culture –the 
“Middle Kingdom” or “Central Civilisation”– came in handy in a Japan where 
many looked for a solution for the constitution of a national polity in face of the 
crises brought by the mid-nineteenth century. The “moral transformation” trope 
–in place for some two millennia to explain the effects of the ideal governance 
in accord with the universal heavenly mandate– was recast in Japan in the 
1820s through the 1860s as the imperative transformation of the disjointed 
individuals, groups and regions into a single cohesive body of a nation, 
a sort of national civil religion. The Confucian universalist language was 
inconspicuously converted to a particularist ideology of nation building. The 
marvelous success of the project in Japan was quickly noted and appreciated 
among the concerned Chinese in the last days of the Qing empire. And by the 
28 Satō Shin’ichi, Kindai Chūgoku chishikijin to bunmei [Modern Chinese Intellectuals and 
Civilisation], Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1996, p. 316-17.
29 Saitō Kowashi, Meiji no kotoba—Bunmei kaika to Nihongo [Meiji words: Progress of civilisation 
and Japanese language], Tokyo: Kōdansha, (1977) 2005; Michael Lackner et al., eds., New Terms for 
New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China, Leiden: Brill, 2001; 
Joshua Fogel, ed. and trans., The Emergence of the Modern Sino-Japanese Lexicon: Seven Studies, 
Boston, Leiden: Brill, 2015.
30 Marius B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1954; Hsiao Kung-Chuan, A Modern China and a New World: K’ang Yu-wei, Utopian and Reformer, 
1858-1927, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975.
146 David Mervart
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 18, nº 35. Primer semestre de 2016. 
Pp. 127-150.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2016.i35.07
opening of the twentieth century, the necessity of manufacturing a nation was 
on the top of the agenda of the Chinese reformers and activists31.
IX.
All that busy stream of multipolar borrowings, transmissions, 
appropriations and recyclings appeared to come to an abrupt end with the 
victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war and the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1948. Like everywhere else, the new 
communist state loudly announced itself as a radical, almost millennial rupture 
with all the things past. Prominent among the feudal relics to be extirpated 
from the present lives and from the memory of the citizenry was the Confucian 
ideology that had allegedly kept the labouring classes in subjection and hindered 
China’s progress. The old world of a moral universalism shared across national 
boundaries seemed to meet its definitive demise. But did it?
The Beijing politburo and the cadres of the party, strengthening their hold 
over not just the present but also the past of the country, are currently busy 
recasting the universalist aspiration to normative “China”-hood as a nation’s 
history and a national cultural heritage32. This serves both to appropriate its 
historical authority as an additional source of legitimacy and to neutralise its 
potential as a critical intellectual force. “Confucius Institute” is now the name 
for the network of cultural centers projecting PRC soft power abroad. A vast 
bronze statue of Master Kong, or Confucius was erected in 2011 outside of the 
National Museum fronting the famous Tiananmen Square in Beijing, to join 
the complete lineup of the communist party’s nationally promulgated icons. 
Before it was moved to a less prominent location some months later, Master 
Kong thus came literally face to face with Chairman Mao, who had in the 1960s 
instigated a movement to root out everything that was still remotely reminiscent 
of the old habits of mind, including the feudal notions of “Confucianism”. The 
posthumous encounter of the two was in fact probably less an unintended irony 
and more an intentional act of reconciliation as both are now fully expected 
to harmoniously inhabit the same national pantheon. Like in the days of the 
Qing emperors, Master Kong’s birthday is once again the object of official 
recognition. Last year, president Xi Jinping gave a high-profile keynote 
31  Cf. Michael Lackner, “Anmerkungen zur historischen Semantik von China, Nation, und 
chinesischer Nation im Modernen Chinesisch”, in Horst Turk et al., eds., Kulturelle Grenzziehungen 
im Spiegel der Literaturen: Nationalismus, Regionalismus und Fundamentalismus, Göttingen: 
Wallenstein Verlag, 1998.
32  Cf. the contribution by Taciana Fisac, “Revolución, política y propaganda en la China 
contemporánea” in this issue and idem, “Discursos del poder en la China contemporánea”, Revista de 
Occidente, No. 414 (November 2015), pp. 20-36.
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speech at an international symposium in Beijing commemorating the 2565th 
anniversary of the sage’s birth in which he stated that the thought associated 
with Confucius’s name represents a record “of spiritual experiences, rational 
thinking and cultural achievements of the nation while it strived to build its 
identity” and added that its cultural heritage has “nourished the flourishing 
Chinese nation”33.
Both the universalist moral aspiration of the learning from the ancient 
sages and the panoply of disparate non-national polities that preceded the 
People’s Republic of China have thus been repackaged as the cultural heritage 
of the state and the state’s nation that extends its dominion over the entire 
past of its territory. It seems such a natural state of affairs that it is difficult to 
imagine how it could ever be otherwise. A peek at the history of the importance 
of being the universal “China” may help to keep us sensitive to the fact that 
many other possibilities have always existed. And considering how heavily the 
nationalised histories all around East Asia weigh on today’s mutual relations 
among the polities in the region, there is something mildly optimistic in the 
realisation that the seemingly inexorable grip of national narratives over the 
totality of the past is a relatively recently descended smoke screen. Perhaps it 
is not here forever.
33  Mu Xuequan, “China commemorates Confucius with high-profile ceremony”, Xinhuanet, 
25 September, 2014. (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-09/25/c_127030072.htm) 
[accessed on 31 January, 2016].
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